responsible for creating it (framing), and the consequent means of dealing with it (taming). In particular we focus on a specific form of 'hard science' evidence being used to underpin policy and shape practice: a neuroscientific discourse of brain claims and its implications. Indeed, appeals to neuroscientific discourse as a driver for early years intervention policies and practice is an international trend (Macvarish et al. 2014 ; see for example Bruer 1999 and Wall 2010);  presented as a determinant fact by the World Health Organisation (http://www.who.int/maternal_child_adolescent/topics/child/development/10facts/en/) and as solving inequalities:
The environmental conditions to which children are exposed including the quality of relationships and language environment I the earliest years literally 'sculpt' the brain'. (Irwin et al., 2007: 7 -italicised 
emphasis in report)
Rather than calls for evidence-based policy making in the early years field being about the thoughtful and discriminating use of relevant research, however, we show how pseudoscientific 'brain science' discourse is co-opted to bolster policy claims about optimal childrearing. This discourse frames poor mothers as the sole architects of social disadvantage, and its taming strategies of early years intervention are entrenching gendered and classed understandings and social inequalities.
Our Research
We draw on our own evidence about 'framing and taming' for this discussion: the 'Brain Science and Early Intervention' research project 2 . This study looks at how accounts of the formative impact of early experience on brain development have come to shape politics, key social policy legislation, and early intervention initiatives and practice, as well as the consequences for everyday practices among health care providers and early years educators: www.brainscience.soton.ac.uk (Edwards et al. 2016, forthcoming The literature and transcripts of talks and interviews were subject to an in-depth discourse analysis, broadly involving close reading of the written text to identify recurring terms, metaphors and references that create and constitute understanding of an issue or set of issues (Gee, 2012) . We draw on analyses of all these materials in our discussion here.
Framing the Evidence in the Early Years Field
Early years policy and service provision in the UK now are characterised by an emphasis on early intervention in the belief that pregnancy and the earliest years of life are most important for development. The idea is to pre-empt rather than react to social, educational and behaviour 'problems', using evidence-based interventions (e.g. Allen, 2011a & b) . The spotlight has alighted not on the unequal material and social conditions in which children live and are brought up as causal, but on parents and how they rear their children. This is as distinct from support as an offer for parents who are going through difficulties, embedded in universal services (Featherstone et al., 2013) . Evidence from social indicators is used to identify particular categorical groups in which 'poor parenting' is said to be leading to 'poor outcomes' for children, so that services and evidence-based interventions can be targeted at those groups (e.g. 'Better Start' area wellbeing profiles:
http://betterstart.dartington.org.uk/resources/data/awp/). We received a copy of the transcript of the entire proceedings as part of our payment for attending the event.
The Westminster Social Policy Forum requested that we point out that speakers have not had the opportunity for any corrections to the transcript and that it does not represent a formal record of proceedings.
There is a consortium of eight organisations … organisations which are specialists in evidence, the evidence based practice. (Sarah Brennan, Chief Executive, YoungMinds)
iv. We have evidence about intervention working but there are hurdles that get in the way:
In our work we've found that it's not really a knowledge problem that we have here, it's a systemic problem … Simply telling people that some of these interventions have a really strong evidence base will not be sufficient. ( I still think the evidence base is weak and there's more to do on the evidence base.
Because we have to get this to a point of producing the evidence that absolutely convinces child executives, Chancellor of the Exchequer to make these investments. Because they don't speak for themselves, no matter how enthusiastic we can all be about all of this. Viewed together, the logic of these various versions of the state of evidence about early intervention in the early years field do not sit comfortably alongside each other. There is the obvious inconsistency of both having (motifs iii and iv) and being in need of (motifs v and vi) evidence of intervention working. Notably also, the discursive motifs of requiring good quality and 'fit for purpose' evidence of the efficacy of intervention (v and vi) call into question the notion of evidence-based policy, since the evidence required is that which shows that interventions that are already in place are working. Indeed, if the evidence required is longitudinal, then the production of evidence cannot precede the adoption of an intervention.
Clearly then, evidence is being used as political strategy, where objectives come first and research evidence is then generated to justify them (Davies, 2003 ) -what Gregg (2010 dubs 'a classic case of policy-based evidence' in the family intervention field.
Further, evidence that the early years are formative (motif i) does not lead in any necessary and direct fashion to a particular form of policy action; rather it has to be mediated and framed in a certain way. We turn to this issue next.
Framing the Early Years Intervention Problem
The reason why a focus on pre-emptive intervention in the early years field is regarded as Science tells us that we may find the solutions to these complex social problems in early childhood, where the architecture of the brain begins to form.
There has been a slew of political and think tank reports across the political spectrum. The examples that we quote here come from, first, one of the independent reviews commissioned by the Conservative Coalition government from Labour MP Graham Allen, making the case for early intervention to counter the damage to babies' and young children's brain development caused by sub-optimal parenting; and secondly, a cross-party 'manifesto' reinforcing the importance of the period from conception to age two for children's brain development and life Overall then, the evidence being called upon is that biological mechanisms underlie personal and societal dysfunction. The quality of parental nurturing and care in the first years of a child's life is claimed to be formative, reflected in the anatomical structure of the child's neural circuits with sensitive mothers producing 'more richly networked brains' (Gerhardt, 2004 : 43) . This 'brain science' evidence thus leads to the calls for intervention to take place in this window of opportunity in a child's life, when synapses are connecting, before it is too late and their brains are hard-wired for failure through deficient parenting.
Yet the state of hard science does not point towards formative hard wiring in any clear-cut fashion. First, current neuroscientific knowledge highlights the long term plasticity of brain structures and functions; brains are constantly reacting to stimulae across the lifespan: forming, embedding and discarding synaptic connections (Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013; Schmitz and Höppner, 2014) . Second, the state of neuroscientific knowledge itself is far from settled and 'policy ready' (Wastell and White, 2013) . It is fluid and developing rather than definitive:
Our early twenty-first century world truly is filled with brain porn, with sloppy reductionist thinking and an unseemly lust for neuroscientific explanations. But the right solution is not to abandon neuroscience altogether, it's to better understand what neuroscience can and cannot tell us, and why. (Marcus, 2012 : online) Indeed, even much cited sources in policy documents can criticise misuse of their work by politicians (e.g. http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/apr/09/ian-duncan-msith-childrensbrains).
This reductionism seems almost beside the point though. Neuroscientific evidence, it seems, is not necessarily called upon for its actual explanatory capacity, but for its persuasive value.
Bruer (1999) has shown how, in the USA, advocacy groups in the mid-1990s started drawing on long established neuroscientific principles to make claims about the primacy of infant brain development in an effort to convince the American public of the value of early education initiatives and to lobby for greater funding for early years services.
Brain claims as evidence are acknowledged as a current politically expedient strategy in the UK too, by proponents of their use to drive early years intervention. For example, a prominent UK policy advisor who we spoke to, like other proponents, asserted that neuroscience has an advance role in pushing policy but is limited in forming it, and emphasised how 'brain science'
overcomes outmoded ideas about social class as shaping life chances:
If you're asking to what extent does neuroscience and just neuroscience influence policy I would say in a very very limited way … there can be a tendency to want to put the neuroscience argument at the front because it's couched in science and, you know we generally speaking believe science has an authority that social sciences doesn't have … When sociologists point out that poor kids have worse life chances than rich kids, is there a danger that people on the Left adopt a kind of crude social determinism? … this kind of crude sociological determinism excused, you know, really an abdication of responsibility.
Highlighting the evidence provided by 'brain science' enables policy makers to endorse and pursue some sorts of policy intervention and to avoid others. They do not have to bother about strategies for redistribution. They no longer have to consider material and social inequalities as causal and in need of policy solutions. They can put that aside and focus down on where the real responsibility lies for the early years problem -how parents, or more specifically mothers, bring up their children and determine their brain architecture.
Brain Claims and Taming the Early Years Problem
The emphasis on evidence-based solutions to social problems as part of new managerialism involves a shift from valuing the knowledge of practising professionals in shaping service developments to prioritising that of auditors, policymakers and statisticians (Rose, 1999) -and now to lauding the 'authoritative' knowledge of neuroscience (Rose and Abi-Rached, 2013 ).
Some commentators have argued that the evidence-based approach not only excludes professional judgement but also erodes professionals' confidence in their ability to make assessments on the basis of their tacit knowledge and practical wisdom (Hammersley, 2001; Marston and Watts, 2003) . Others declare that professionals acquire the new discourses and become party to their dissemination (Davies, 2003) , and that in the social work field, the concern for evidence-based practice is adopted as a political strategy articulated by an unstable occupational group in the context of occupational upheaval It is a strategy to gain regard, status and recognition (McDonald, 2003) , or even a radically democratising strategy that empowers professionals (Trinder, 2000) .
From our interviews with practitioners working in the early years field it appears that both positions can be the case. Practitioners can feel that neuroscience provides new evidence, separate from but to some extent dependent on the expertise that they have built up over the years, and also that it offers valuable knowledge that means others must pay attention to them.
All these facets are captured in the account given by an early years professional with over two decades of experience:
If you follow the [intervention] programme in the way that it's set up you're going to have the best outcome … It's got to be confidence backed by a good foundation of knowing you've been able to practice safely and well for a long time. Taming the problem of how babies' brain development leads to educational, social and behaviour failure, means that services are targeted at mothers living in poor communities.
They carry forward the gendered and social class assumptions embedded in the evidencebased policies into practice interventions. While often couched in the gender neutral terminology of 'parenting', early intervention largely is directed at mothers as the core mediators of their children's development, where the foundations for optimal brain development are located in pregnancy (e.g. Kinsley and Franssen, 2010) . Underpinned by 'brain science' evidence, the early years workers attribute the fact that the mothers in whose lives they intervene are poor and living in difficult circumstances to the way that they were brought up by their own mothers, where their own brains were hard-wired for failure:
A lot of these young people have had complicated young lives and maybe if left just to their own devices just to bring up their new baby they would repeat patterns that they'd had in their young childhood. This [intervention] programme gives them wellresearched advice and an opportunity to discuss a different way of parenting this new baby. So just break cycles of behaviour and patterns of behaviour that have grown up within families through generations ...The more we know, the more we understand.
The more appropriate support can be given to perhaps try and break what previous generations have, how they've acted. To help the biological processes play out in the way they're meant to when you're doing everything you should have done. So I think it would have a big impact on a lot of people if they knew as much as perhaps we do.
In this way, social and material inequalities are explained and justified as individual and familial failure; the poor have caused their own poverty. Wider structural and economic factors are not recognised within the taming interventions that are framed by an evidence-based practice built on brain claims.
Conclusion
Early intervention has come to occupy an increasingly ideological role in the context of contemporary politics. Policymakers are not merely responding to self-evident social problems, they are 'framing and taming' them in a particular way. Drawing on brain science claims, the social, behavioural and economic problems and inequalities faced by society are framed as the result of deficient parenting. Consequently, the means of taming the problems is to intervene in how the people who create the problems for society bring up their children.
As we have discussed in this article however, rather than hard science and technical rationality informing early years policy making and professional practice, the use of evidence is a political strategy. Appeals to the existence of and need for evidence about the efficacy of intervention are inconsistent and a classic case of 'policy-based evidence'. While the state of emergent neuroscientific knowledge points to plasticity across the lifespan, rather than hard-wiring of failure in pregnancy and the first few years of life, 'brain science' claims act as a politically expedient strategy for policy adoption of targeted interventions that focus on poor mothers and their deficient childrearing practices as the root of the problem. The evidence from our study is that the pursuit of particular interventions in the early years field using expedient brain claims as a justification is entrenching gendered and classed understandings and inequalities.
